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INTRODUCTION

When
commentators,
lawyers,
judges,
politicians,
businesspeople-anyone really-are looking to heap abuse on part of
the civil process, they complain about discovery. But in truth, civil
discovery is treated cruelly and often misunderstood. This is the case
for two reasons. First, we do not know much about what actually
happens in civil discovery in different types of cases. As a result, people
seem to fill in the gaps of knowledge with their priors, which are, in
turn, dependent on a few examples that loom large in their
imaginations. Whatever limited reliable evidence about discovery we do

have-and it is indeed very limited-is too often ignored in favor of
reflexive vilification. Second, critics rarely consider the public benefits
of discovery or its positive externalities, instead focusing mostly on its
private, largely monetary costs and benefits.' The only way to prevent
*
Ellen Ash Peters Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. Thanks to Brian
Fitzpatrick and participants in Vanderbilt Law Review's "The Future of Discovery" Symposium,
including several judges who provided me with useful background information. Thanks also to
Peter Siegelman for comments on previous drafts and to Jonah Gelbach and Miguel de Figeueredo
for suggestions.
1.
See Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 54 (1997) ("Private
litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial states by public officers working
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discovery from being abused is to know more about it and to evaluate
its full costs and benefits. This Article proposes a modest change to
litigation practice to help scholars, judges, and policymakers learn the
truth about discovery. I propose that every discovery request be entered
in the court docket. Given electronic filing, courts and litigants will
incur few costs from this change, and researchers can analyze the
information collected to determine the extent of discovery use and
abuse.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I will evaluate the three
core allegations against discovery: (i) that parties use discovery to raise
rivals' costs so that they can increase the value of settlement, (ii) that
parties use discovery to go on fishing expeditions without a solid basis
in fact, and (iii) that information asymmetry is not a sufficient reason
to allow discovery. As we will see, these complaints are interlinked,
especially the latter two, which both concern uncertainty. Part II will
discuss some of the benefits of discovery. Part III will describe the
resistance to empirical evidence available about discovery and the
limitations of that evidence. This Part points out that most of the
evidence used to criticize discovery is based on surveys of lawyers either
overseeing or litigating cases, and that much of this survey evidence is
unreliable. The reason people rely on survey evidence is that the use of
discovery is not tracked. Accordingly, Part IV will propose a solution to
the empirical problem: track the use of discovery tools in the federal
courts. This is relatively easy to do. Much like nutritionists' advice to
patients that they keep a food diary, tracking discovery will allow us
both to find out how it is used (how much chocolate cake litigants are
eating) and to help litigants make better choices (choose carrots instead
2
of cake).
I. THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DISCOVERY

This Part considers three criticisms of discovery, a short
catalogue of some of the ways discovery is abused, and related issues. I
begin by discussing the phenomenon of raising rivals' costs, the main
concern that seems to have spurred the recent changes to the discovery
rules. These changes put, front and center, a proportionality
within an administrative bureaucracy."); Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in
Discovery Reform and the Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 35
(1994) ("Clark marveled at how the new procedure would permit litigators to enter the New Deal
and to amass the information relevant to policymakers.").
See Miranda Hitti, Keeping Food Diary Helps Lose Weight, WEBMD (July 8, 2008),
2.
http://www.webmd.com/diet/news/20080708/keeping-food-diary-helps-lose-weight
[https://perma.cclVQ2E-7ZEE] (citing Jack. F. Hollis et al., Weight Loss During the Intensive
Intervention Phase of the Weight-Loss Maintenance Trial, 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 118 (2008)).
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requirement, which had been in the rules but was not particularly
influential. 3
A second concern, which has received less attention, is
uncertainty in discovery. This concern surfaces in two arguments. The
first is that parties go on fishing expeditions to find out information that
may or may not exist, raising costs needlessly. These are "known
unknowns" or, in some cases, "unknown unknowns."4 The second
argument is that uncertainty may exist only on one side because there
are information asymmetries. These are secrets. It is in the interest of
the party who holds secrets to make the discovery request seem like a
fishing expedition when, in fact, it is a request for information that the
party would prefer not to disclose. For this reason, parties'
representations regarding the validity of their opponents' discovery
requests should generally be considered unreliable.
A. Raising Rivals' Costs
In his well-known commentary titled Discovery as Abuse, Judge
Frank Easterbrook posited that litigants use discovery in order to
increase costs to their opponents.5 By increasing costs (or threatening
to), litigants can raise the amount at which it is worthwhile for their
opponent to settle. This is because "[a]l1 of the models of settlement
imply that parties divide between them the gains from avoiding
litigation." 6 The value of settlement is equal to the estimated cost of
litigating to completion plus the predicted value of the underlying
claim. If a claim is worth $100 and its likelihood of success is fifty
percent, then $50 is an appropriate settlement amount. If a claim is
worth $100, the likelihood of success is fifty percent, and the cost of
litigating to completion is $100, the claim is worth somewhere between

3.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment.
4.
This phrase is taken from a press conference given by Donald Rumsfeld in 2002. He
stated:
The message is that there are no knowns. There are things we know that we know.
There are known unknowns. That is to say there are things that we now know we don't
know. But there are also unknown unknowns. There are things we do not know we don't
know. So when we do the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we
then say well that's basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known
knowns and the known unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those
unknown unknowns. It sounds like a riddle. It isn't a riddle. It is a very serious,
important matter.
Donald Rumsfeld, U.S. Sec'y of Def., Department of Defense News Briefing (June 6, 2002),
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/sO2O6O6g.htm [https://perma.cc/FL6J-WQJT].
5.
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 637 (1989).
6.
Id. at 636.
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$50 and $150. If an opponent can credibly threaten to increase the
litigation costs to $150, the range of settlement value also rises.
According to Judge Easterbrook, it is easy for rivals to increase
7
costs because district courts exercise little oversight of discovery. There
was no empirical basis for thinking this claim was true in 1989, when
Judge Easterbrook published his article, and he cites none. And there
was no basis for thinking that district court judges did not control
discovery in 2007, when the U.S. Supreme Court cited Judge
8
Easterbrook for this proposition in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.
Nevertheless, Judge Easterbrook's assertion was used to support the
contention that the pleadings doctrine needed to be tightened to prevent
discovery abuses that would result in defendants settling "anemic"
cases. 9 In the follow-on case, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court
rejected the lower courts' attempts to show that they could manage
discovery and prevent needlessly raising rivals' costs, again citing to
Judge Easterbrook's statement without further inquiry or empirical
support.1 0 We could use a little more evidence-based procedure.
What the Supreme Court failed to note was that increasing
rivals' costs is a tactic that can be used by both sides. The Court was
only concerned with the effect of discovery on defendants," but both
sides can raise costs. Surely, a plaintiff in a discrimination suit can
raise costs by asking the defendant-employer for email correspondence
2
that will be voluminous and costly to produce.1 But just as easily, a
defendant can raise costs by seeking a psychological or physical
13
evaluation of the plaintiff and her private email correspondence. Or a
defendant can raise costs by asking for reimbursement for excessive
information-technology work that made the emails available to be
produced. Both requests may be arguably permissible in that they are
"relevant to any party's claim or defense," and both may even be
''proportional to the needs of the case," depending on how the judge
interprets the "importance of the issues at stake in the action" and other
7.

Id. at 638.

8.

550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007).
.

Id. ("[I]t is only by taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting
9.
conspiracy that we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery. .

10. 556 U.S. 662, 684-86 (2009).
11. Id.
12. Swanson v. Citibank, NA., 614 F.3d 400, 411-12 (7th Cir. 2010) (Posner, J., dissenting
in part) (reasoning that the plaintiffs ability to raise costs on the defendant by seeking electronic
discovery justifies a higher pleading standard).
13. For example, in one recent case, a magistrate judge limited the defendant's ability to
obtain the plaintiffs social-media posts in native file format, which would have given the defendant
access to certain metadata. The plaintiff had provided the posts in PDF format. In re Cook Med.,
Inc., IVC Filters Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:14-nil-2570-RLY-TAB, 2017 BL
326237, at *3-4 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 15, 2017).
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factors. 14 The bottom line is that this tactic may pressure either side to
settle, depending on the relative resources of the parties. 15 The system
may even create incentives for both sides to increase rivals' costs.
Although not strictly raising rivals' costs, one additional
consideration needs to be taken into account: the calculation of lawyers'
fees, especially when lawyers are paid by the hour. As one defense
lawyer told researchers, "There's an element of the lawyers . . . do[ing]
more than necessary. They staff up a case beyond its needs, for example,
sending two or more lawyers to attend a deposition or any other
proceeding." 16 A plaintiffs' lawyer explained, "'We have a saying in the
plaintiffs' bar that "You have to feed the tiger first"' before defendant
attorneys will settle a case."1 7 To the extent that the litigation budget

is separate from the budget for settling a case, a general counsel ("GC")
may find it easy to approve additional discovery expenditures, even
when they needlessly increase the costs of the suit. It seems unlikely
that anything can be done by regulators or rulemakers to reduce the
incentives of defense lawyers to grandstand or of GCs to use their
litigation budgets to raise rivals' costs.
How often is it the case that parties increase costs without a
likely benefit, just to raise the value of settlement or, worse yet, the
costs to their own client? We do not know. Reports from parties
themselves will always be biased on this matter, and most of the
available studies rely on surveys that are unreliable for the same
reasons. At the same time, as we shall see, the extant studies based on
surveys indicate that discovery is proportional to the value of the case
and that, overall, this proportion is relatively small. This indicates that
it is unlikely that raising rivals' costs is a problem in the run of cases.
And that insight, in turn, requires us to consider to what minority of
cases this analysis applies and whether it is possible to isolate that
minority and legislate only with respect to the cases that raise the
problem.

&

14. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1).
15. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53
BUFF. L. REV. 1369, 1398 (2006) ("Party capacity to litigate not only affects the outcome of
individual cases, but shapes the judicial agenda."); Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 95, 120-21 (1974) ("[T]he
broader the delegation to the parties, the greater the advantage conferred on the wealthier, more
experienced and better organized party." (footnote omitted)); see also THOMAS E. WILLGING
EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEws ABOUT COSTS AND

PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 10 (2010), https://www.fic.gov/sites/default/files/
2012/CostCiv3.pdf [https://perma.ccJ6LV-GMKG] ("Our interviews suggest that part of the
variation in cost might be explained by the resources or size of the party and the character and
specialized experience of the attorneys.").
16. WILLGING & LEE, supra note 15, at 10.
17. Id.
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B. Uncertainty:Fishing Expeditions and InformationAsymmetry
A second concern about discovery is the problem of uncertainty.
If we knew what information existed, then it would be possible to
analyze the value of that information to the litigants and society, then
weigh that value against the cost of producing that information.
Analysts could determine whether a litigant was merely trying to raise
rivals' costs or had a valid reason for requesting the information.
Similarly, analysts could evaluate whether the request was
18
proportional to the needs of the litigation, as required by the rules.
Here some examples are helpful.
In the early 1990s, a group of children injured by an Escherichia
coli contamination of unpasteurized apple juice sued the juice
manufacturer. 19 As it turned out, some months before the outbreak, the
manufacturer had been inspected by the U.S. military in connection
with the potential sale of its juice in commissaries. 20 In its letter to the
juice manufacturer, the Army wrote, "We reviewed the deficiencies
noted in the report, which our inspector discussed with you at the time
of the inspection. As a result, we determined that your plant sanitation
program does not adequately assure product wholesomeness for
military consumers." 2 1 The company did not disclose this letter as part
of discovery in the lawsuit brought by the injured children. 22 The lawyer
representing the children learned of the letter's existence from an
23
anonymous voicemail and filed a FOIA request with the Army.
Further discovery uncovered emails that proved that the juice company
considered testing its finished products for pathogens after it received
the letter from the Army; however, it decided not to because it was
worried the data would lead to bad publicity. 24 The emails were written
in early September 1996.25 One child died and at least twenty-five were
26
hospitalized in November of that year.
This is not only a case of a very bad actor, both in terms of the
underlying wrongdoing and litigation conduct, but also an example of
the problem of unknowns-how is a lawyer litigating a case such as this
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
19. Bill Marler, Another Lesson Learned the Hard Way: Odwalla E. Coli Outbreak 1996,
MAIRLER CLARK: MARLER BLOG (Jan. 23, 2013), https://www.marlerblog.com/legal-cases/anotherlesson-learned-the-hard-way-odwalla-e-coli-outbreak-1996/ [https://perma.cc/P344-M8B9].
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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supposed to know that there is a smoking-gun letter in the defendant's
files? Or that this same letter might be obtained from a third party?
Sometimes parties have experience with institutions and know that
certain types of records are kept as part of routine business. Other times
whistleblowers or third parties either point to the existence of
information or maintain it themselves. It would be useful to know, for
example, how often discovery requests are made of third parties,
especially regulatory agencies, and how often judges rule that litigants
should look beyond the parties to the litigation to obtain information.
Is it common for a defendant to have access to relevant, even
critical, information and keep it a secret? A study published in 1980
found that almost all litigants settled cases without revealing "arguably
significant" information. 27 Perhaps this was an admission against
interest, which should be relied upon; perhaps it was gloating and
should be discounted. The discovery rules in 1980 were much more
generous than they are today. Accordingly, there is even more reason
to worry about undisclosed information-the known unknowns. The
truth is, there is no good quantitative data, and there is unlikely to be.
Qualitative data could and should be gathered, but there are no recent
studies. There are, however, case studies pointing to likely problems. 28
A recent Supreme Court decision overturning sanctions for
blatant discovery abuse seems likely to exacerbate any existing
tendency to withhold discoverable information in violation of the
rules. 29 A family sued manufacturer Goodyear Tire, alleging that one of
its tire models was prone to separation and blowouts when driven on
the highway. 30 The plaintiffs asked for the results from tests of the tire
that Goodyear had conducted; the company did not provide these and,
according to the trial court, misled the court about their existence. 31
Every judge that reviewed the case agreed that Goodyear had withheld
evidence that it should have released. Sometime after the case had
settled, the plaintiffs' lawyer learned that there were, in fact, such test
27. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 5 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 819 (1980) (reporting that ninety-five percent
of lawyers had worked on cases that settled without opposing counsel learning of "arguably
significant" information in a deposition).
28. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetry and Adequacy in Discovery Incentives: The
DiscouragingImplications of Haeger v. Goodyear, 51 AKRON L. REV. 639 (2017).
29. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 1178, 1186, 1190 (2017) (limiting
attorney's fees sanctions to those incurred because of the discovery misconduct); see also Stempel,
supra note 28, at 657-61 (analyzing Goodyear).
30. Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1184; see also Dennis Wagner, Judge: Goodyear Deceptive in
Defense of Flaws in Tire, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Sept. 3, 2015, 8:56 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/
story/news/arizonalinvestigations/2015/09/03/goodyear-deadly-tirescoverup/71618544
[http://perma.cc/B529-PQRJ] (discussing specific design flaws in tires).
31. Stempel, supra note 28, at 649.
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results. He read about them in a media account of a different trial in
which this evidence was introduced. 32 The subsequent suit for sanctions
resulted in a Supreme Court decision that entitled the plaintiffs only to
the fees engendered by their attempts to obtain discovery (such as the
cost of bringing a motion to compel).3 3 Relative to the potential costs of

producing highly damaging information and the benefits of hiding such
information, this sanction is insufficient.
A second example is more recent and comes from the litigation
surrounding defective ignition switches in Cobalt cars, manufactured
by General Motors ("GM"). This story concerns unknown unknowns.
Several wrongful death lawsuits had been filed against GM, alleging
that a defect in the Cobalt car had caused the car to shut down while
driving, resulting in a crash in which the airbags did not deploy (airbags
will not deploy when the car is not on). 3 4 The company's lawyers largely
discounted the threat of this litigation, and the internal investigation
into the defect was slow. 35 The part causing the defect, the ignition
switch, was identified, but the company did not understand why it was
defective.3 6 Ultimately, one of the plaintiffs' experts determined why
the ignition switch was faulty. 37 It would have been impossible to know,
at the start of the litigation, that the expert inspection would yield
answers to questions GM itself had not yet answered. Yet under
restrictive discovery rules, the plaintiffs' expert might not have been
allowed to access the information she needed in order to make her
assessment.
There are many other such stories in products liability litigation
and beyond. In most of the stories that are publicly available, pushing
in discovery actually resulted in the information ultimately being
released, either in the litigation or in another case. But we do not know
the stories in which the information was never released, for obvious
reasons. What these stories teach us is that information is sometimes
hidden. Sometimes it is kept a secret. Sometimes decisionmakers do not
know information that they should. Other times information is
available but is not salient to decisionmakers until after an accident
happens. Information can be hidden by defendants or by plaintiffs. And
this information is often crucial not only to the litigants themselves but

32.
33.

Goodyear, 137 S. Ct. at 1184.
Id. at 1186.

34.

See generally ANTON R. VALUKAS, REPORT TO BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF GENERAL MOTORS

COMPANY REGARDING IGNITION SWITCH RECALLS (2014), http://www.beasleyallen.com/webfiles/
valukas-report-on-gm-redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM34-7PH2].
35. Id. at 102-15.
36. Id. at 161-80.
37. Id. at 180-82.
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also to the public because regulations change in response to the
information obtained in litigation and its accompanying publicity. An
honest analysis of the costs and benefits of discovery must deal with
these issues-that is, the fact that crucial hidden information is often
revealed as a direct result of civil discovery.
II. THE BENEFITS OF DISCOVERY

Discovery serves two purposes. First, it provides the parties with
information that will assist them in presenting their claims or defenses
to the court.3 8 Second, discovery yields information that the public and
regulators can use to better prevent future misconduct. 39 One might
characterize the second purpose as derivative of the first-that is, the
information produced to support claims or defenses often is also useful
to regulators. As Paul Carrington, who has been a reporter to the Rules
Committee, wrote, "We should keep clearly in mind that discovery is
the American alternative to the administrative state. . . . Private
litigants do in America much of what is done in other industrial states
by public officers working within an administrative bureaucracy." 40
Whether this devolution of enforcement to private actors is ideal from
a social-welfare point of view is beyond the scope of this Article, but
given the current preference for a less robust administrative state, this
is part of the regulatory landscape. 4 1
The best way to understand the importance of discovery is to
consider what happens when a company reasonably believes that it can
delay or even prevent discovery entirely. The following story illustrates
how important discovery is to the deterrent capacity of tort law. It is
38. Parties may request "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). This provision limits the requests to those "proportional to the
needs of the case." Id. This latter language could be read to constrict the role of discovery in
revealing information also relevant to the public and the administrative state; however, the factors
for the court's consideration in making this judgment include things such as "the importance of
the issues at stake" and the "likely benefit" of discovery as compared to its cost and expense, which
could be read to encompass benefits to the public. Id. Indeed, the note to the rule recognizes that
the case may "seek[ ] to vindicate vitally important personal or public values" and that this should
be taken into account in determining the scope of discovery. Id. advisory committee's note to 2015
amendment.
39. In this way, discovery is not unlike tort law, which has both an individual compensatory
purpose and a collective deterrent purpose. For an argument about the relationship between these
two purposes of tort law, see Mark A. Geistfeld, The Coherence of Compensation-DeterrenceTheory
in Tort Law, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 383, 404-09 (2012).
40. Carrington, supra note 1, at 54.
41. See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 34-41 (2017) (reviewing three
mechanisms of regulation: by agency, by government lawsuits, and by private lawsuits). Although
the book praises litigation, it does so within the confines of the extant system, which prefers a
rather anemic administrative state relative to other nations to whom American politicians
compare our country.
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what one might call a worst-case scenario. How representative is this
story? At the moment, there is no way to know. And, indeed, I recognize
that by telling such stories, I am relying on anecdotes rather than data
to make my case. The last Part of this Article proposes a way to
understand the actual contours of discovery. This story, therefore, is
merely illustrative of what is sometimes the case, although nobody
knows how often.
In 1984, DuPont executives attended a meeting in Delaware in
which they reviewed a careful cost-benefit analysis regarding a highly
toxic chemical called C8, which was used in the process of making
Teflon. 42 They knew that C8 "does not break down in the environment,
accumulates in human blood, travels from pregnant mothers to their
babies, and seeps into local drinking water supplies." 43 The company's
legal and medical teams recommended that the company stop using
C8-instead, the executives doubled its usage. 44 The company protected
its employees, not allowing female employees of child-bearing age to
come into contact with it, for example, but allowed the chemical to
contaminate the water near the company's West Virginia plant. 45
Approximately 3,500 people who lived in the area were ultimately
diagnosed with diseases linked to C8.46
Why did DuPont, a company with a reputation for
environmental responsibility, do this? Because they counted on their
ability to minimize or, at least, delay their risk of liability by keeping
this information hidden. 47 And they were right. An analysis of the costs
and benefits of C8, even after the company paid fines and tort
judgments, found that the benefits to DuPont of continuing to produce
the chemical far outweighed the money DuPont paid out, largely (but
not only) because the company was able to delay the day of reckoning

42. Roy Shapira & Luigi Zingales, Is Pollution Value-Maximizing? The DuPont Case 2 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 23866, 2017).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 6-10.
46. Id. at 7.
47. "By controlling information, DuPont was able to co-opt regulators, delay enforcement,
and limit the ability of academics or journalists to chime in." Id. at 4. The authors add, "Companies
face incentives to suppress potentially damaging information, so as to keep the plaintiff lawyers
away." Id. at 21. An important question is whether the tort system creates an incentive for
companies to hide wrongdoing and whether, in addition to sticks, the system should adopt carrots
to encourage companies to take remedial measures to avoid liability. The current system favors
secrets and delay over remediation. See Wendy E. Wagner, ChoosingIgnorancein the Manufacture
of Toxic Products,82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 820-21 (1997) ("Defense lawyers tout the effectiveness
of ignorance of long-term product effects as a defense to litigation, and this advice appears to be
followed, in some cases successfully." (footnote omitted)).

2018]

A PROPOSAL TO END DISCOVERYABUSE

2047

for so long. 4 8 But those benefits to the company did not outweigh the
costs imposed on third parties: the health costs, the pain and suffering
of cancer victims, and the longer-term costs to the environment. 49 All of
this would have been different had the company not managed to evade
discovery for so long. Its ability to continue producing harm (some of it
irreparable) would have been curtailed, and its costs would have
increased, because it would not be discounting the potential liability
over a twenty-to-thirty-year period.
As a counterpoint, consider the story of the fast-food hamburger
chain that was sued by a number of families in the early 1990s after
undercooked hamburgers poisoned their children with E. coli.5o
Discovery in that litigation showed that the company ignored the
danger. Although it was widely known in the scientific community that
E. coli in ground meat was potentially deadly, this fact was published
in the press prior to the outbreak, and the company was aware that it
should have been cooking meat at a higher temperature based on local
health regulations. 1 Ultimately, the company paid $98 million to the
families and restructured its entire operation from purchasing to
preparation. 52 None of this would have happened but for discovery and
accompanying litigation exposure. Similarly, as described in the
previous Part, there is evidence that GM would not have discovered the
extent of the risk from defective ignition switches, or the root cause of
the problem, except through litigation and especially one of the
plaintiffs' experts. 53
III. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ABOUT DISCOVERY

Reviewing the available data on civil discovery, it is hard to
conclude that discovery is really a significant problem in the federal
courts. 5 4 Yet criticisms of discovery continue to be levied despite the
48. The researchers found that, setting the reputational costs at zero, the company stood to
gain $1.1 billion in profits if it continued to manufacture the toxin, whereas it faced fines and costs
of only $100 million at present value in 1984, when the decision was made. Shapira & Zingales,
supra note 42, at 2, 16-17.
49. Id. at 14-15.
50.

JEFF BENEDICT, POISONED: THE TRUE STORY OF THE DEADLY E. COLI OUTBREAK THAT

CHANGED THE WAY AMERICANS EAT (2011); see also LAHAV, supra note 41, at 49-50 (pointing to E.
coli litigation as an effective regulator in lieu of weak government regulation).
51. BENEDICT, supra note 50, at 258-61.
52. Id. at 290.
53. VALUKAS, supra note 34, at 180-82.
54. See CORINA D. GERETY & BRITTANY K.T. KAUFFMAN, INST. OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE
AM. LEGAL SYS., SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE PROCESS: 2008-2013,

at 9-28
(2014),
http://iaals.du.edulsites/default/files/documents/publications/summary-oL
empirical research on the civil-justice process_2008-2013.pdf
[https://perma.cclK74Y-SCYC]
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best empirical evidence to the contrary.5 5 In reforming discovery in
2015, the Rules Committee largely ignored the empirical evidence in
favor of "lawyers' normative assessments of the overall system."56 And,
in his 2015 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, Chief Justice
Roberts highlighted the importance of discovery reforms without
reference to any empirical findings.5 7 Lawyer perceptions persist
despite significant evidence to the contrary-evidence that has been
available for years. For example, an American Trial Lawyer survey in
2008 found that eighty-five percent of respondents believed that
"litigation in general and discovery in particular are too expensive."5 8
This raises an important psychological question: Why do high-level
participants in the system ignore empirical data that does not fit with
their priors?5 9 Is it even possible to have an empirically based law of
procedure in light of the obstinate power of anecdote over data? This
Part will first review the best available data, then consider the
implications of the limits of scientific knowledge about the civil justice
system.

(reviewing existing studies). I only address the federal judicial system; we know even less about
the state courts, even though the vast majority of cases brought in the United States are filed
there. Some interesting work is being done on state court discovery reforms. See, e.g., NAT'L CTR.
FOR STATE COURTS, UTAH: IMPACT OF THE REVISIONS TO RULE 26 ON DISCOVERY PRACTICE IN THE

UTAH DISTRICT COURTS (2015), https://www.nesc.org/-/medialfiles/pdf/topics/civil%20procedure/
utah%20rule%2026%20evaluation%20final%20report(2015).ashx [https://perma.cc/L8ZY-TYC6].
Revisions in Utah included setting discovery tiers for cases with different amounts in controversy.
Id. at iii. Researchers found that these reforms increased the settlement rate and decreased the
time to final disposition. Id. at iv. It is unclear what effect the reforms had on other factors, such
as information that might be of public concern or settlements under conditions of limited
information.
55. It seems this has been true forever. See, e.g., Benjamin Kaplan, A Toast, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1879, 1881 (1989) ("The much criticized discovery function and class action remain together
the scourge of corporate and governmental malefactors."); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in
DisarrayiThe Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded
Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (1994) (describing and disputing the perception of widespread
discovery abuse).
56. Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1054 (2016).
57.

JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5-7, 10-11

https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
(2015),
[https://perma.cc/XM8Z-T469].
58.

AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT

OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT 4 (2008), http://iaals.du.edu/sites/default/files/
documents/publications/interimreportlfinal-forweb.pdf [https://perma.ccN4VZ-JNXD].
59. See Lonny Hoffman, Examining the Empirical Case for Discovery Reform in Texas, 58 S.
TEX. L. REV. 209, 221 (2016) ("It is sobering to reflect on how policy debates are often conducted
with little regard for the actual facts."); Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact
Studies in the Administrationof Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 13, 29 ("Data
have great trouble piercing made-up minds. Some judges and lawyers believe there are only two
kinds of research findings: those they intuitively agree with ('That's obvious!'); and those they
intuitively disagree with ('That's wrong!').").
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The best available recent study was conducted by the Federal
Judicial Center ("FJC") in the run up to the discovery amendments of
2015.60 This was a survey of two thousand lawyers who had recently
litigated cases in the federal courts. Instead of asking these lawyers
how they perceived discovery generally, the researchers asked lawyers
about the most recent federal lawsuit they litigated. The main findings
were that (i) discovery is more or less proportional to the value of the
underlying case, (ii) discovery is slightly costlier for defendants than
plaintiffs, and (iii) discovery costs are low except for the ninety-fifth
percentile of cases and above. In other words, most litigation sees little
discovery. For example, the researchers found that the median
discovery costs were $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants. 61
Discovery costs for plaintiffs were about 1.6 percent of the stakes and
for defendants about 3.3 percent of the stakes. 62 So defendants pay more
for discovery, but the cost of discovery as a percentage of the stakes is
not a large. These data indicate that plaintiffs are not very successful
at raising rivals' costs to an extent that would drive settlement offers
up appreciably.
Further, discovery costs were about the same in 2009 as they
were in 1997, adjusted for inflation-a surprising finding considering
the rising costs of legal services over this same period. 63 Electronic
discovery also does not have much of an impact. The study found that
only five to ten percent of attorney time spent on discovery was spent
specifically on electronic discovery. 64 The FJC researchers also found
that the drivers of higher discovery costs were largely what one would
expect: higher stakes and factual complexity. 65

60. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-BASED
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/
2009),
ON
CIVIL
RULES
(Oct.
CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.ce/N7T5-FQP2] [hereinafter PRELIMINARY REPORT]; see
also EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., LITIGATION COSTS IN CIVIL

CASES: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS (Mar. 2010), https://www.fje.gov/sites/default/files/2012/
CostCiv1.pdf [https://perma.cc/78WY-VZHM] [hereinafter MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS].
61. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 60, at 35-36.
62. Id. at 42.
63. Id. at 36; see Gillian K. Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Services to
Promote Access, Innovation, and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191, 1192 (2016)
("[O]ur existing approaches to regulating the American legal profession increase costs, decrease
access, stifle innovation, and do little to protect the interests of those who need or use legal
services."); see also MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 6, 8 (demonstrating that the size of
the firm affects costs for both plaintiffs and defendants).
64. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 60, at 40 ("The median estimate of electronic discovery
costs as a percentage of discovery costs in cases with an electronic discovery request was 5 percent
for plaintiff attorneys and 10 percent for defendant attorneys.").
65. MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 5-7. Lee and Willging found that each 1%
increase in stakes resulted in a 0.25% increase in costs for both plaintiffs and defendants, and that
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That there is ordinarily little discovery is supported by older
studies as well. For example, a 1998 study found that "the majority of
the civil cases have either no discovery or limited discovery." 66 In those
cases where there was discovery, it took up about twenty-five percent
of lawyer time on the case as a whole.6 7
In high-stakes litigation, the story is different. The discovery
costs reported by the FJC in cases at the ninety-fifth percentile were
much higher than the median.6 8 But pure costs do not help much in
evaluating whether discovery is too much, too little, or just right.
Consider the patent litigation between Apple and Samsung. The
lawsuit apparently cost a total of approximately $1 billion for both
parties. 69 This is an enormous amount of money but is also the rough
equivalent of two weeks of iPhone sales at the time the litigation was
conducted. 70 It appears that the cost of the entire litigation, not only
discovery, was proportional to the monetary value of the case.7 1 These
high costs are consistent with empirical findings in intellectual
property cases more generally; the FJC researchers found that
intellectual property cases reported sixty-two percent higher discovery
costs than the baseline. 72

each one-unit increase in complexity, on a seven-point scale, resulted in an 11% increase in costs
for plaintiffs and a 13% increase for defendants. Id.
66. James S. Kakalic et al., Discovery Management: FurtherAnalysis of the Civil Justice
Reform Act EvaluationData, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 623 (1998).
67. Id. at 637.
68. PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 60, at 35-36. Another survey confirms that the costs of
litigation holds are similarly felt in a small number of costly cases. See William H.J. Hubbard, The
Discovery Sombrero and Other Metaphors for Litigation, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 867, 893-94 (2015)
("For companies of all sizes, the costs in lost employee time are significant."). That survey was
commissioned by a trade group in an attempt to influence discovery reforms. See id. at 880-81. It
does not evaluate the relationship between the costs of litigation holds and social welfare.
69. Kurt Eichenwald, The Great Smartphone War, VANITY FAIR (May 3, 2014, 9:45 AM),
http://www.vanityfair.comlnews/business/2014/06/apple-samsung-smartphone-patent-war
[https://perma.cc/ZX7L-5MBQI (describing the costs of this litigation); Dimitra Kessenides, When
Apple and Samsung Fight, the Lawyers Win, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 9, 2013, 3:41 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2013-12-09/apple-samsung-patent-wars-mean-millionsfor-lawyers [https://perma.ccl52JW-E32T].
70. Kessenides, supra note 69.
71. From a social-welfare perspective, was this the best use of these funds? As Mark Lemley,
the leading patent scholar, told a journalist, "[It's not clear what good it does society to have them
spend a billion dollars suing each other." Id. But this evaluation depends on what Apple and
Samsung would have done with this money otherwise, and we do not know the answer to that
question. Perhaps they could have invented an even better electronic gadget or given a larger
dividend to their shareholders, but it is almost certain that they would not have used it to find a
cure for cancer. One lawyer explained to the FJC researchers the relationship between litigation
costs and the stakes of litigation: in pharmaceutical cases, reportedly, companies "are willing to
put down up to $20 million for the right to sell a drug for $1 billion." WILLGING & LEE, supra note
15, at 8.
72.

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS, supra note 60, at 8.
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In sum, the empirical evidence based on surveys of lawyers
responding to queries about specific cases indicates that there is not a
lot of discovery in the median and that what discovery is conducted is
proportional to the value of the case. However, in the highest-value
cases, there is significant discovery, and the higher the case value (and
the more complex the case), the higher the discovery costs will be. This
makes sense and is not a flaw of discovery but rather a characteristic of
the problems the court system is asked to solve and the structure of the
profession that is charged with solving them. 73
We saw at the start of this Part that the dominant narrative that
discovery is disproportionately expensive is very sticky. What is to be
done? The system would likely benefit from studies of the mechanisms
at work, despite the resistance to empirical evidence in procedural
rulemaking. 74 In a field devoted to reason, it is unacceptable to rest
decisions that affect litigants, regulators, and the health and safety of
many people on anecdotes or assumptions. Researchers must therefore
continue to push for what Professor Gillian Hadfield calls a "public
health" approach to law. 7 5 Access to better data, as discussed in the
following Part, will help answer many questions about how the rules
we already have work. For example, how often do litigants use
boilerplate documents (either requests or responses) in discovery? 76

73. To accuse the civil justice system of being at fault for these phenomena is a mistake. Due
process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard, which, in turn, requires giving both sides
an opportunity to develop their evidence for presentation at trial. Things of value-and I include
due process in this category-are often costly. Although it is said that the best things in life are
free, litigation is something that occurs when things have gone wrong. It is a social good but not
something in which most people relish engaging. At the same time, the structure of the legal
profession plays a significant part in the problems with the civil justice system, of which discovery
is but a very small part. See Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Barriers to Innovation: The Growing
Economic Cost of Professional Control over CorporateLegal Markets, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695
(2008) ("The entropic growth in the complexity of law and legal procedures, rooted in the
traditional practices of lawyerly reasoning and dispute resolution, is the primary driver of
increased costs." (footnote omitted)).
74. Cultural cognition may be one promising avenue for further study. See Dan M. Kahan et
al., Fearof Democracy:A CulturalEvaluation of Sunstein on Risk, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1071, 1083
(2006) (explaining cultural cognition as it applies to an individual's decisionmaking). A recent
study found that judges are able to neutrally apply the law even when faced with culturally
divisive matters. Dan M. Kahan et al., "Ideology" or "Situation Sease"? An Experimental
Investigation of Motivated Reasoning and Professional Judgment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 349, 355
(2016).
75. Gillian K. Hadfield, JudgingScience: An Essay on the Unscientific Basis of Beliefs About
the Impact of Legal Rules on Science and the Need for Better DataAbout Law, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 137,
163 (2006). Why judges cannot turn this same neutrality on their evaluation of the system of which
they are a part is a question worth studying further.
76. See Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Breaking the Boilerplate Habit in Civil
Discovery, 51 AKRON L. REV. 683, 684 n.2 (2017) (noting that while there are no empirical studies
on the use of boilerplate documents, it is the authors' experience that these documents are
ubiquitous).
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What is the level of motion practice accompanying discovery, and in
what types of cases? Do individual judges' rules affect the rate of
77
discovery disputes? Does discovery promote settlement?
IV. A PROPOSAL: DISCOVERY DOCKETING
If there is general agreement that good policy (and that is what
discovery is-a form of social policy that impacts individual litigants
and our collective health and safety) should be based on empirical
evidence rather than conjecture, then the next step is to increase
knowledge about how discovery works. Getting data at the moment is
extremely difficult because discovery proceeds outside the courts unless
78
there is a dispute between the parties about its scope or propriety.
But it would be (relatively) easy to change all that with a
requirement that litigants file discovery requests and responses with
the court. With the advent of electronic docketing, this should not be
very difficult, time consuming, or draining on judicial and
administrative resources. But it will require judicial cooperation. It
might begin as a pilot project in a few districts, which might provide
enough information for a reliable study. The following should be
included in these filings:
*

*

*

Initial disclosures under Rules 26(a)(1)(A), 26(a)(2)(A) and
26(a)(3)(A) should be entered as "Discovery-[Party] Initial
Disclosure." This may be provided in the form of a cover letter
to the actual disclosures, listing which categories are included
and what documents are attached. The attachments
themselves need not be filed.
All supplemental disclosures under Rule 26(e) should be
entered, and a cover letter to the actual disclosures should list
which categories are included and documents attached, all
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Supplemental
Disclosure."
Notice of depositions served under Rules 27(a)(2), 30(b)(1)-(6),
and 31(a)(3) and follow-up letters on the length and date(s) of

77. See Kuo-Chang Huang, Does Discovery Promote Settlement? An Empirical Answer, 6 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 241, 275 (2009) (finding that permitting discovery promoted settlement
in the Taiwanese legal system).
78. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1) (allowing a party who seeks protection from discovery
requests to do so by motion); FED. R. Civ. P. 34(a) (allowing a party to serve a document request
on another party without requiring court',approval); see also Matthew A. Shapiro, Delegating
Procedure, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 983, 1014 (2018) ("The default in ordinary civil litigation thus
remains a regime of party-driven discovery and settlement, with only the prospect of more
significant judicial involvement lurking in the background.").
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each deposition should be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-[Party] Deposition."
* All stipulations about discovery procedure entered into
pursuant to Rule 29 should be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-Stipulation."
* All interrogatories served pursuant to Rule 33(a) and
responses served pursuant to Rules 33(b) or (d) should be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Interrogatory"
and
"Discovery-[Party]
Interrogatory
Response,"
respectively.
* All requests for the production of documents served pursuant
to Rule 34(a) and responses and objections under Rule 34(b)(2)
should be entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party]
Document Request" and "Discovery-[Party] Document
Request Response," respectively.
* All amended requests for production of documents and
responses should be entered into the docket as "Discovery[Party] Amended Document Request" and "Discovery-[Party]
Amended Document Request Response," respectively.
* All requests for physical and mental examinations and
responses to those requests pursuant to Rule 35 should be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Rule 35
Request" and "Discovery-[Party] Rule 35 Request Response,"
respectively.
* All requests for admission pursuant to Rule 36(a) and
responses or objections should be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-[Party] Request to Admit" and "Discovery[Party] Request to Admit Response," respectively.
* All motions to compel discovery and responses should be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Motion to
Compel" and "Discovery-[Party] Motion to Compel
Response," respectively.
A model standing order can be found in the Appendix at the end
of this Article. As most of the items listed are produced in any event in
connection with discovery, filing them should not increase the hours
lawyers spend on discovery. Indeed, nearly all filings listed are
documents that lawyers already serve on one another in discovery; the
innovation here is to file them with the court. The only requirement
above that would add work beyond what lawyers already do is the letter
describing the date and length of depositions conducted. I anticipate
that drafting such a letter (which can be done by a paralegal) should
not take more than five to ten minutes per deposition and therefore

2054

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:6:2037

would not be a serious imposition. The main concern for litigants is that
confidential information might be made public, and this can be
addressed through ordinary confidentiality orders, as illustrated in the
model order. The main concern for researchers is that in order for the
data to be useful, they must be able to access it, and the relevant filings
must be consistently coded. A district interested in adopting this
proposal can grant researchers free access to the electronic filing system
used by the federal courts, Public Access to Court Electronic Records
(commonly known as "PACER"), to facilitate this research.
Why should judges sign on to this idea? In the short term, it is
likely that requiring lawyers to file discovery requests will change
lawyer behavior for the better.7 9 It is one thing to serve and withdraw
a request when the other party complains; it is quite another thing to
file it with the court and know that the judge may look at it. While this
proposal assumes that judges will not frequently look at these filings, it
becomes possible once a request is filed, and the possibility of being
watched may have the effect of cabining the most expansive or
outrageous requests or responses. I predict that the possibility of being
observed would limit only the most abusive requests or responses; this
is because lawyers are path dependent and unlikely to change behavior
that is considered to be standard in the profession, absent some robust
intervention. On the other hand, it is possible that parties will move to
a more informal system in order to avoid filing their requests. They may
exchange requests by letter or conference call initially, determine their
disagreements, and only then propound formal discovery requests.
Lawyers may not move to a more informal system, however, so long as
no penalty is associated with propounding discovery requests.
A second reason for judges to adopt this recommendation is to
expand knowledge of the court system. This is an end in itself and has
the potential to produce better procedures to the benefit of judges,
litigants, and the general public. If discovery requests were available,
researchers could use them to provide descriptive statistics about
discovery that do not currently exist. For example, researchers could
determine how often initial discovery is submitted and how robust these
exchanges are; how often initial discovery is supplemented; how many
iterations of requests are exchanged before a motion to compel is filed
in document or other discovery; how many depositions are noticed; the
length of depositions; the number of interrogatories; the extent to which
answers to discovery requests delay the production of documents; how
79. This predicted result is analogous to the "Hawthorne effect," which describes "changes in
behavior attributable to the knowledge by individuals that they are experimental subjects-rather
than to the substance of the experimental manipulation." Michael Abramowicz et al., Randomizing
Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 950 (2011).
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often boilerplate objections to discovery are used and in what types of
cases; how these vary across judges and districts; and more.
What kinds of studies could be done with this information? If
discovery requests were available, researchers could determine in what
proportion of cases discovery requests were made (and of what type)
and could analyze requests based on type of defendant (institutional or
individual), type of plaintiff, and type of case. For example, the number
of depositions permitted without court approval is ten.80 How many
depositions are in fact conducted and in what types of cases? How often
do litigants seek permission to take additional (or longer) depositions?
Does the presence of an institutional plaintiff or defendant change the
number of depositions? Are these requests symmetrical between
parties? With detailed data on the timing and "size" of discovery
requests (and their costs), it should be possible to detect the existence
of strategic behavior.8 1
Similarly, we know that in some cases, document discovery is
requested of third parties. How often does this occur and in what
context? How often do judges order litigants to seek information from
third parties rather than from their adversary, and what cost does this
impose on others?
Numbers of cases in which there were disagreements about
discovery, even if there were no motions to compel, could be ascertained.
What is the ratio of motions to compel to discovery requests filed in a
given case? How often do parties dispute discovery requests short of
filing motions to compel? How many times do parties file discovery
requests that are not adequately answered before turning to the court
for assistance? Does this change based on type of case, size of law firm,
or other factors that can be objectively determined?
There are limits to what empirical studies can tell us. For
example, the question of whether there is too much or too little
discovery (in general or in a given case) is a normative one that depends
on values, not on objective data. Whether the litigation costs (including
discovery) are too high in a case depends on how one values the process
and the result. Even assuming that there is general agreement that the
law should be enforced, there may be differences of opinion regarding,
for example, how much error the system should tolerate and whether
error that results from inability to obtain information should be treated

80. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A)(i).
81. For an example from a different context with rich data (online auctions), see Benjamin
Edelman & Michael Ostrovsky, Strategic Bidder Behavior in Sponsored Search Auctions, 43
DECISION
SUPPORT
SYS.
192
(2007),
https://web.stanford.edul-ost/papers/cycling.pdf
[https://perma.cclPGA9-AAE6].
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82
differently than other types of error. There may also be differences in
the way we value different rights. Perhaps the interest in bodily
integrity that is often the subject of tort cases is valued differently than
83
the dignity of a due process case. There may also be disagreement as
to whether the value to third parties from discovery, such as the value
added when information produces regulatory change, should be
considered in determining the benefits. Another key difficulty in
creating a proper cost-benefit analysis is that the benefits of discovery
(or lack thereof) are easier to calculate ex post, once we know what has
been discovered or hidden away, but the costs are easier to calculate ex
ante and tend to be the focus of discourse. That is, I may know that it
will cost the company n dollars to produce information, but I cannot
predict, until after the suit, whether the benefits of discovery are
greater or less than n. But a first step toward answering these
normative questions and determining the usefulness of information
obtained in different types of cases is to evaluate how much discovery
actually happens and how much discovery is resisted. Without that
information, any position on the costs and benefits of discovery is
suspect.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of civil discovery is to produce transparency in each
side's case, both to help in fairly resolving the dispute at hand and to
provide important regulatory information for observers, be they future
defendants, regulators, or consumers. More transparency is needed to
allow researchers to investigate how civil discovery works, how much
there is, and what its benefits are. The misperceptions, lack of
knowledge, and assumptions about the scope and costs of discovery
stand in the way of making real progress in how to manage civil
litigation and whether reform is needed at all. Instead of operating
based on prior experiences or surveys, courts should start collecting
hard data on discovery that can inform these debates and lead to more
evidence-based procedure.

82. For a discussion of the relative values of risk of error versus additional process, see Jerry
L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 (1976).
Mashaw's discussion is equally applicable to civil procedure as administrative hearings, as the
trade-offs are very similar.
83. Cf. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 248 (1978) (holding that the violation of a due process
right as a dignitary offense does not entitle the victim to damages and that "in the absence of proof
of actual injury, the students are entitled to recover only nominal damages").
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APPENDIX: MODEL DISCOVERY DOCKETING ORDER

1. The Court's Requirements for Discovery Docketing
In order to assist in the study of the federal court system and
particularly the use of discovery, all discovery requests and
exchanges listed below shall be filed electronically.
A. The following discovery requests and responses must be filed
electronically, subject to subsection (1)(B).
1. Initial disclosures under Rules 26(a)(1)(A), 26(a)(2)(A), and
26(a)(3)(A) shall be entered as "Discovery-[Party] Initial
Disclosure." This may be provided in the form of a cover
letter to the actual disclosures, listing which categories are
included and what documents are attached. The
attachments themselves need not be filed.
2. All supplemental disclosures under Rule 26(e) shall be
entered, and a cover letter to the actual disclosures shall list
which categories are included and documents attached, all
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Supplemental
Disclosure."
3. Notice of depositions served under Rules 27(a)(2), 30(b)(1)(6), and 31(a)(3) and follow-up letters on the length and
date(s) of each deposition shall be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-[Party] Deposition."
4. All stipulations about discovery procedure entered into
pursuant to Rule 29 shall be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-Stipulation."
5. All interrogatories served pursuant to Rule 33(a) and
responses served pursuant to Rules 33(b) or (d) shall be

entered

into

the

docket

as

"Discovery-[Party]

Interrogatory"
and "Discovery-[Party]
Response," respectively.

Interrogatory

6. All requests for the production of documents served pursuant
to Rule 34(a) and responses and objections under Rule
34(b)(2) shall be entered into the docket as "Discovery-
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[Party] Document Request" and "Discovery-[Party]
Document Request Response," respectively.
7. All amended requests for production of documents and
responses shall be entered into the docket as "Discovery[Party] Amended Document Request" and "DiscoveryResponse,"
Request
Document
Amended
[Party]
respectively.
8. All requests for physical and mental examinations and
responses to those requests pursuant to Rule 35 shall be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Rule 35
Request" and "Discovery-[Party] Rule 35 Request
Response," respectively.
9. All requests for admission pursuant to Rule 36(a) and
responses or objections shall be entered into the docket as
"Discovery-[Party] Request to Admit" and "Discovery[Party] Request to Admit Response," respectively.
10. All motions to compel discovery and responses shall be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-[Party] Motion to
Compel" and "Discovery-[Party] Motion to Compel
Response," respectively.
B. Parties may request that information filed pursuant to (1)(A) be
redacted and/or filed under seal by letter brief, which shall be
entered into the docket as "Discovery-Confidentiality." Such
requests are subject to the same rules as any other requests for
sealing court records.

